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CoNFLICT OF LAws-FuLL FAITH AND Crumrr-CusTODY DECBEEs-Husband and wife, living in Ohio, were separated in 1945, the only child going to
live with the paternal great-grandfather in Pennsylvania. Husband and wife
were divorced in Ohio in April 1949. Custody of the child was awarded the
wife, but because of the wife's defective vision the child was to remain temporarily with the great-grandfather; it was further provided that the custody question could be relitigated after eighteen months. On October 26, 1949, the wife
got a further Ohio decree awarding her sole custody. 1 The great-grandfather
refused to surrender the child, and wife filed a petition for habeas corpus in
Pennsylvania, November 2, 1949. The Superior Court reversed the trial court

1

Husband's lawyer appeared and asked for a continuance, which was denied.
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and granted the writ.2 Held, reversed, two judges dissenting. The Ohio court
did not have jurisdiction to make the custody decree of October 26, and therefore the decree need not be given full faith and credit in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 367 Pa. 553, 80 A (2d) 829 (1951).
Custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit in sister states,3 unless
the court making the award was without jurisdiction.4 The basic question thus
becomes: what is the requisite jurisdictional basis to render a custody decree
binding upon other states? Some courts have held that the child must be physically present within the territorial limits of the state making the award; 5 other
courts have held that residence of the child in the state is the proper jurisdictional basis.6 The majority of the courts, and the Restatement, hold that only
courts of the state of the child's domicile7 can make a custody award which will
be given full faith and credit in sister states.8 The court in the principal case
says that either domicile or residence is a proper basis,9 but proceeds to base its
2 Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 167 Pa. Super. 470, 75 A. (2d) 614
(1950).
8 U.S. CoNST., Art. IV, §1. CoNFLICT OP LAWS RESTATEMENT §147 (1934); GooDBICH, CoNFLICT OP L.Aws, 3d ed., 423 (1949); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202,
54 S.Ct. 181 (1933); In re Leete, 205 Mo. App. 225, 223 S.W. 962 (1920). Custody
decrees may be moclliied, however, if there has been a change in conditions since the first
decree. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903 (1947); Commonwealth ex rel.
Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930); Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 78, 187 P.
598 (1920). Moreover, the courts often require very little to find a subsequent change in
conditions. Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 P. 918 (1914); Gaunt v. Gaunt, 160
Okla. 195, 16 P. (2d) 579 (1932).
4 Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 P. 987 (1928); Brandon v. Brandon, 154 Ga.
661, 115 S.E. ll5 (1922). Cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct.
1092 (1945). The court in the principal case says, at 561, that full faith and credit need
not be given when the court had "doubtful" jurisdiction, relying on Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Halvey v. Halvey, supra note 3, at 618.
5 De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, ll2 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896); Sheehy v.
Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 A. l (1936), 107 A.L.R. 635 (1937); Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss.
292, 12 S. (2d) 425 (1943). Stansbury believes that when courts speak of presence they
often really mean residence. Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State
Lines," IO L.Aw AND CoNTEM, PnoB, 819 (1944).
6 Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, ll2 S.W. (2d) 165 (1938), ll6 A.L.R. 1293
(1938); Titcomb v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 220 Cal. 34, 29 P. (2d) 206
(1934). In support of this view, Stumberg, ''The Status of Children in the Conllict of
Laws," 8 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 42 (1940).
7 "Domicil is the place with which a person has a settled connection for certain legal
purposes, either because his home is there, or because that place is assigned to him by law."
CONFLICT OP LAws REsTATEMENT §9 (1934). A person may have several residences or
no residence, but he always has one domicile. See, GoonRICH, CONFLICT OP L.Aws, 3d ed.,
50 (1949).
s CoNFLICT oP LAws REsTATEMENT §117 (1934); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT op LAws
§144.3 (1935); Callahan v. Callahan, 296 Ky. 444, 177 S.W. (2d) 565 (1944); Jones v.
McCloud, 19 Wash. (2d) 314, 142 P. (2d) 397 (1943); Larson v. Larson, 190 Minn.
489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934). For a discussion of the various views, 47 MICH. L. REv. 703
(1949).
9 Principal case at 559. This language is in accord with Pennsylvania decisions.
Teitelbaum v. Teitelbaum, 160 Pa. Super. 286, 50 A. (2d) 713 (1947); Camp v. Camp,
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decision on the tenuous finding of fact that neither the domicile nor residence
of the child was in Ohio at time of the decree. 10 The theory behind the majority
view is that custody is a status, and jurisdiction to determine matters of status
is in the state of domicile of the person whose status is being affected.11 It has
been objected, however, that custody is more of a physical than a legal relationship, and thus is not truly a status.12 But there is a more fundamental objection
to the majority view: because of the artificial· rules determining domicile of
children,18 a child may never have been present in the state of his domicile,
and the state may have no interest in him.14 Welfare of the child, the first
principle in custody cases,15 is thus subverted. The writer feels that the conllict
in the decisions can be explained as an attempt by the courts to avoid such
subversion.16 Unfortunately, the avoidance devices adopted by the courts are
not satisfactory. Neither presence nor residence within the state is a desirable
jurisdictional basis; both raise the risk of allowing a state, where the child
happens to be temporarily resident or present, to pass on the custody question
and bind a sister state which has a much greater interest in the child, and where,
perhaps, reside all the persons qualified to testify in the custody litigation. On the
other hand, for the courts to circumvent the force of the full faith and credit
clause by superficial findings of no jurisdiction in the court making the decree is
to set the stage for never ending custody litigations, from state to state, with consequent detrimental effects on the child. It is submitted that jurisdiction to render

150 Pa. Super. 649, 29 A. (2d) 363 (1942). See, Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance
Law Across State Lines,'' 10 I.Aw AND CoNTEM, PROB. 819 (1944), in support of concurrent jurisdiction for custody decrees.
10 As pointed out by the dissenting opinion
11 CoNFLICT oP LAws REsTATEMENT §119

in the principal case at 571.
(1934); Goodrich, "Custody of Children

in Divorce Suits,'' 7 CoRN. L.Q. 1 at 3 (1921).
12 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines,'' 10 I.Aw AND
CoNTEM. PnoB. 819 at 820 (1944).
·
18 As a general rule, a legitimate child takes the domicile of his father. CoNPLICT oP
1.Aws RESTATEMENT §30 (1934); GooDRICH, CONFLICT OP LAws, 3d ed., 83 (1949);
Brandon v. Brandon, supra note 4. After a custody decree, the child's domicile is that of
the person awarded custody. CoNFLICT OP LAws RESTATEMENT §32 (1934); In re Volk,
254 Mich. 25, 235 N.W. 854 (1931). If the father abandons the wife and child, the child
takes the domicile of the mother. REsTATEMENT, §33; Elliott v. Elliott, 181 Ga. 545, 182
S.E. 845 (1935).
14 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines,'' 10 LAw AND
CoNTEM. PnoB. 819 at 820-823 (1944).
15 MADDEN, DoMESTIC RELATIONS 369 (1931); In re Rosenthal, 103 Pa. Super. 27,
157 A. 342 (1931); In re Leu, 240 Mich. 240, 215 N.W. 384 (1927).
16 Note the tenuous finding of the principal case, supra note 10. Also see, Ex parte
Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 256 N.W. 833 (1934); Elliott v. Elliott, supra note 13; Titcomb
v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, supra note 6; In re Leu, supra note 15. If the
child's welfare will be protected under the majority rule, the court will not depart from it.
Ex parte Inman, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 130, 89 P. (2d) 421 (1939); Kruse v. Kruse, 150
Kan. 946, 96 P. (2d) 849 (1939); Brandon v. Brandon, supra note 4; People ex rel.
Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 27 P. (2d) 1038 (1933).
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a custody decree binding on sister states should be solely in the state having the
greatest and closest connections with the child;17 that state would be the one
best qualified to determine the custody question, and presumably the one having
the greatest interest in the child's welfare. With such a jurisdictional basis, it
should follow that sister states would no longer hesitate to accord full faith and
credit to custody awards, and they will have a degree of stability which they
have not yet enjoyed. The suggested approach would accomplish the primary
objective of the law in custody cases--securing the best interests of the child.18
James I. Huston

17 This

state will usually be the state of the child's domicile, but not always. Supra

note 7.

1s See, 81 Umv. PA. L. REv. 970 .at 971 (1933).

